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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:
SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE CASE OF CHECHNYA
Luke P. Bellocchi"
The recent crisis in Chechnya has brought criticism of world leaders
around the world, for acquiescing to the violent suppression of an attempt by
a self-declared state to secede from Russia. This incident marks yet another
case of inconsistent application by the international community of the
generally recognized principles of self-determination and statehood in
international law. Since the decolonization era, the United Nations and its
members have struggled over the precise meaning of self-determination.
Recently, there have been a slew of new nations emerging from the crumbling
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, of which Chechnya claims to be one.
This paper reviews the traditional and newly forming standards by which a
people may form a sovereign state and be recognized as such by the
international community. It then tests Chechnya's claim against those
standards, finding, ultimately that the claim is valid.
Traditionally, the term "self-determination" was used in the context
of decolonization. It was first used by President W. Wilson and although it
never found its way into the League of Nations Covenant, it did become part
of the United Nations Charter (Art. 1 and 55).2 There is indication that
"peoples" as referred to in those UN Charter articles, became a term which
included more than the decolonized populations? This concept was reaffirmed
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in the UN Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations4 and in the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, as
well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.'
These peoples, once identified, have been regarded by many scholars as having
the right to determining their own political and cultural identity as a matter of
customary international law.6
The questions then become, when, where, and how, in a non-colonial
context, can a peoples, utilizing their inherent and UN Chartered right to self-
determination, secede into an independent nation-state? First, it must be noted
that some scholars reject the idea of self-determination as a right on the
grounds that a state not yet legally existing cannot have legal rights. But
others, have argued a different understanding of this area of law. For instance,
Henkin has announced his understanding that the concept of sovereignty
should not even survive in the near future, much less maintain it as a deterrent
against self-determination.8 Moreover, scholars, such as Binder and Franck,
argue that there are factors in international law which indicate that peoples
exist and are entitled to the right of self-determination, thereby investing those
rights through international legal criteria.9
Various formulations and factors have been suggested to define
peoples and their right to statehood through self-determination, but it should
be noted that there is still dispute over whether a people have the automatic
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1 GA Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, UN Doc. A/8028
(1970), 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970).
1 GA Res. 2200,21 GAOR, Supp. 16, UN Doe. A/6316 at 490,6 I.L.M. 360
(1967). GA Res. 2200, 21 GAOR, Supp. 16, UN Doe. A/6316 at 52, 6 I.L.M. 368
(1967).
6CLIVE PARRY, et al., ENCLYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 361
(1988), (citing IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 595
(3rd ed. 1988)).
7 LOuis HENKiN, et. al., INTERNATIONAL LAW 303, 3d. ed.
(1993) (citing Fitzmaurice, The Future of Public International
Law, in LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE, ANN. INST. DE DROIT INT'L 1973,
at 233, n. 85).
8 Louis Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY:
'THE CHALLENGE OF A CHANGING WORLD 17 (Alaine Hughes, et. al. eds. 1992).
9 Guyora Binder, The UaseJor SelfDetermnination, 29 STAN.J.INT'L L. 223
(1993). Louis HFENKN, et. al., INTERNATIONAL LAW 303, 3d. ed. (1993) (citing
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right to secede."° The European Community has formed "Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union," which
calls for (1) respect for the Charter of the United Nations, (2) guarantees for
the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities under the framework
of the CSCE Helsinid Final Act, (3) respect for the inviolability of all frontiers
which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement, (4)
acceptance of commitments for regional stability and security, (5) commitment
to settle by agreement, all questions of State secession; it prohibits the
recognition of entities which are the result of aggression." A more traditional
approach is to find the existence of a people through a subjective assessment
of the ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural ties of the group claiming the
right. 2 The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States required
four elements of statehood: (1) a permanent population; (2) a defmed territory;
(3) government; and a (4) capacity to enter into relations with other states. 3
Kirgis, in a more modem approach, argues that the two most
important factors are the degree of destabilization in any given claim and the
degree to which the responding government represents the people belonging
to the territory; these are to be measured on a sliding scale to determine the
legitimacy of the claim.'4 Halperin et. al., have suggested an altogether new
approach to self-determination, which emphasizes (1) an unbiased attitude
(i.e.- not status quo), (2) classification of the claim into one of six different
types of claims, (3) an evaluation of the ruling government's conduct, (4)
historical factors, (5) the people's choice, (6) an evaluation of the conduct of
the self-determination movement, and (7) the potential for violent
10 See Dietrich Murswiek, The Issue ofta Right of Succession - Reconsidered, in
MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 21 (Christian Tomuschat, ed. 1993). See
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 Oct. 1970.
" EC Declaration on the "Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern
Europe and in the Soviet Union," Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting,
Brussels, 16 Dec. 199 1, EC Bulletin 12-1992, p. 119; UN Doc. S/23293 of 17
Dec. 199 1, Annex II; 31 I.L.M. 1486 (1992).
12 MORTON H. HALPERIN, supra note 1, at 47.
13 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1993, 165
L.N.T.S. 19, art 1
11 Kirgis, supra, note 2, at 308.
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consequences.' s
Knop has categorized many of these factors into two theories,
constitutive and declaratory. 16 Constitutive theory requires that established
states recognize the newly formed state before it is legitimate. This involves
a subjective ruling by the established states as to whether a peoples have
formed a state. Declaratory theory only involves the newly formed state
meeting already established international criteria on statehood. Chechnya, of
course, would have to find statehood under this second theory, as the UN and
states in general have declined to extend diplomatic recognition."
Cheehnya must find its claim to sovereignty by fulfilling the objective
factors discussed above, including the precedents set by the recognition of all
the former Soviet Republics. To understand the claim, one must look at the
events that led up to the declaration of independence by Chechnya, the
recognition of the Soviet republics by the international community, and the
events that have led to Russias recent aggression.
After the failed Soviet coup in 1991, Russia did not declare
independence but rather announced that its laws superseded the Soviet
Union's.18 The United States and the European Community granted diplomatic
recognition to Russia on Dec. 25, 1991 and it took up the Soviet Union's seat
in the United Nations. 9 President Yeltsin then tried to persuade all of Russia's
republics to preserve the federal structure, granting the republics the power
over their own foreign and economic affairs, except as to budgetary, defense
and currency matters; Chechnya-Ingushetia and Tartarstan rejected that
treaty.' ° Chechnya had, in fact, declared independence on Nov. 2, 1991, under
15 HALPERIN, supra note 1, at 74.
16 Karen Knop, The "Righting" of Recognition: Recognition of States in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY: THE CHALLENGE OF A
CHANGING WORLD 39 (Maine Hughes, et. al. eds., 1992).
"' See Boris Sitnikov, Boutros Ghali: Chechen Crisis is Russia's Internal Affair,
ITAR-TASS news agency, Jan. 19, 1995.
18 HALPERIN, supra note 1, at 153.
19 Id.
20 Giffin C. Hathaway, Chronology of Events, January 1992 to October 1993, in
KAREN DAWiSHA & BRUCE PARROTT, RusSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA
298 (1994). Id. Federal Treaty (Treaty on Demarcation of Jurisdictions and
Powers between the Federal Organs of State Power of the Russia Federdtion and
the Organs of Power within the Russia Federation), Russica Information Inc.,
RusData Dialine - RusLegisLine, LEXIS (Mar. 13, 1992).
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elected president Dzokhar Dudayev, and Ingushetia broke off from Chechnya
to remain in the Russian Federation in 1992.1
With the recognition of the former Soviet republics as independent
states, one might ask, why is it so hard to recognize the statehood of a Russian
republic, an autonomous region under Russia's federation? The fact that
President Yeltsin explicitly asked for the Russian republics to sign a treaty
affirming a federal structure, while granting autonomy in foreign affairs,
further strengthens the Chechen claim that the republics were recognized as
independent or at least had the right to secede. Otherwise why would Moscow
be asking for Chechnya's agreement to cede the federal structure? Soon after
the failed 1991 coup, M. Gorbachev, the then Soviet leader, attempted to form
a decentralized union between the Soviet republics. Although it received some
support, that attempt ultimately failed. That attempt at treaty closely tracks
the case of President Yeltsin's attempt to preserve the federal structure of
Russia. Should not the United States and European Community follow the
same criteria in recognizing states of the former Soviet Union? The case is
further made by looking at the factors for self-determination discussed above,
including the EC guidelines for recognition of state in the former Soviet Union.
There are five factors for diplomatic recognition of a former Soviet
republic under the EC Guidelines.' First, the new entity must respect the
Charter of the United Nations especially with regards to human rights, rule of
law and democracy. Chechnya has had democratic elections' and in all
respects has followed the peaceful principles of the United Nations Charter;
is it not Russia, with its egregious aggression that has violated those
principles? Second, the Guidelines require respect for the rights of ethnic
groups. Chechnya allowed Ingushetia, the only area of any other ethnic
significance, to cede from it peacefully. Contrary to that policy, Russia has
reacted violently to Chechnya's claim from the beginning, when it first tried to
send troops into the area at the end of 1991 24 Third, the Guidelines require
respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by
peaceful means and common agreement. This requirement may seem
21 KAREN DAWISHA & BRUCE PARROTT, RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURAsIA
67 (1994). Tom Post, et. al., Yeltsin's Iron Fist, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 9, 1995, at.47.
HALPERIN, supra note 1, at 153, at 154.
22 EC Bulletin, supra, note 14.
23 Timothy J. Colton, Politics, AFTER THE SOVIET UNION 32, (Timothy J. Colton
& Robert Legvold, eds. 1992)
24 DAWiSHA, supra note 21, at 68.
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somewhat contradictory, but the element referring to peaceful means has,
again, only been violated by Russia. The fourth requirement refers to
commitments on disarmament and regional security and stability. Chechnya
has no weapons of mass destruction to speak of but as far as regional stability
and security, Chechnya was not an aggressor in any way, but merely put up a
defense of its proclaimed capital, Grozny. Finally, the Guidelines require the
newly formed states, including Russia, to settle by agreement and arbitration,
all questions concerning State secession. Russia has not submitted to
arbitration to settle this secession dispute but instead has submitted to using
force of arms. If anything, Russia has violated all the requirements of the
guidelines, and Chechnya, none. If the European Community were deciding
on whether to extend recognition to Russia now, would they, in light of the
recent aggression in Chechnya?
Even under a more traditional approach to self-determination, the case
of Chechnya passes muster. A look at the ethnic, linguistic, religious and
cultural ties of the Chechens indicates that they are a separate and distinct
group of people. According to the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, a publication
that no doubt was regulated by the Soviet authorities, the ancestors of the
"Chechen peoples" inhabited the mountains of the Chechen region since
around the first half of the first millennium B.C., and became part of the early
feudal state Alania.1 Islam came into the region from Dagestan in the late
16th century and by the 19th century was the dominant religion. Around the
early part of the 18th century, the Nakcho ethnic group became known as
Chechens after the mountain village of Chechen.26 Their language has been
formed from the Nakh group of languages that come from that mountain
region.' The Soviets have claimed that the first Russian ties with the region
came about during the Persian Campaign of Peter I in 1722, but due to tsarist
colonial policy, Chechens under the imams Gazi-Magomed, Gamzat-Bek, and
Shamil (Caucasian War 1817-64) resisted fiercely.' By 1859, the resisting
Chechens had capitulated overtly, but it is apparent that they did not delight
25 V.B. Vinogradov & N.P. Gritsenko, Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic, GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA 79, v. 29, translated and
republished by Macmillan, Inc. (1982).
26 Id.
21 THENEWENYCLOPEDIABRITANNICA 145, v.3, 15th ed. (1993).
28 V.B. Vinogradov, supra note 24. Id. The constant fighting between Russians
and Chechens during this time became the setting of Leo Tolstoy's THE CossAcKs.
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in subjugation.' After World War H the Chechens were accused of siding
with the Germans and were exiled to central Asia until Nikita Khruschev
reestablished them as the autonomous oblast of Chechen-Ingush in 1957.30
The population of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR in 1989 was 1,338,023 and
apparently has the means to be self-sufficient through their vast petroleum
resources and diversified agriculture?' The long history and distinct culture
of the Chechens, along with the distinctness and autonomy that the Russians
have treated them, surely indicates the distinctness of the people, and their
right to self-determination, under this subjective test.
A more objective test of statehood is the Montevideo Convention on
Rights and Duties of States, which requires a permanent population, a defined
territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with other states.3"
As mentioned above, the Chechen government, under the presidency of
Dzokhar Dudayev, has claimed the territory of the "former" Russian republic
of Chechen-Ingushetia minus the territory that the Ingush people have ceded
from it. It contains a population of roughly 750,000 people, mainly of
Chechen decent. Any government, sensibly, has the capacity to enter into
relations with other states. For instance, Azerbaijan recognized Chechnya's
right to form foreign relations by initiating an alliance with Chechnya" As
such, Chechnya's status as a people and as a state can be exhibited not only
under these older approaches, but also, it can be likewise demonstrated under
the newer approaches as put forth by Kirgis and Halperin:
Kirgis argues that the most important factors in self-determination are
the degree of destabilization and the degree to which a responding government
represents the people belonging to the disputed territory." While the dispute
has become destabilizing, it did not need to be, if the Russians had decided not
to use force in the matter. The very fact that the Russians decided to enter the
republic with militaristic intent, illustrates the degree to which the Russians
were unrepresentative. Furthermore, the Chechen government not only refused
to sign the federal treaty with Russia at the time Russia itself claimed to be a
newly formed state, but instead ceded. The Chechen people were not
29 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNICA, supra note 27.
30 Id.
31 DAWISHA, supra note 20, at 335, Appendix C - Soviet Census Data, Union
Republic and ASSR, 1989. Id. Vinogradov, supra note 25.
32 See Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, supra note 11.
33 DAWiSHA, supra note 21, at 224.
3 Kirgis, supra note 2, at 308.
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represented .in the Russian legislature since their secession. The forced
removal of the Chechen people after World War II, as mentioned above,
further demonstrates the unrepresentativeness of the Russian dominated Soviet
Union. These two factors are difficult to reconcile since the very nature of a
secession claim means the people no longer want to be represented in another
government. Yet the claim can embroil destabilizing forces in the dominant
government which can seek to belittle the claim under this standard by
destabilizing the situation. The final set of standards, suggested by Halperin,
incorporates these two factors into another newly formulated legal theory on
self-determination.
Halperin discusses eight factors to be considered when evaluating a
self-determination claim: (1) an unbiased attitude (i.e.- not status quo), (2)
classification of the claim into one of six different types of claims, (3) an
evaluation of the ruling government's conduct, (4) historical factors, (5) the
people's choice, (6) an evaluation of the conduct of the self-determination
movement, and (7) the potential for violent consequences."5 First, the major
powers of the world did not look at this conflict in an unbiased manner, but
instead worried about the destabilizing effect they thought would result from
a Chechen secession. As it turns out, there really was no other threatening
secession movements, especially in light of the fact that all the other Russian
republics, save one, signed the federal treaty on preserving the union. Second,
Halperin classifies movements into six different types, of which the Chechen
crisis can only fall into the Sub-state self-determination category. This
category, it is claimed should be, "considered in light of the historic, ethnic,
religious, or economic dimensions of the group's dispute with the ruling
government ...." Those issues were evaluated above in the discussion on the
traditional approach to self-determination. Third, the ruling government's
conduct, of course, has been violent aggression against the Chechen.people.
Fourth, historical factors were again discussed above in the section on the
traditional approach to self-determination. Fifth, the Chechen people have
apparently spoken on the issue through the election of a secessionist
government under Dzokhar Dudayev, and through the wave of volunteers
willing to give and have given their lives to defend their homeland. Sixth,
although there have been reprehensible incidents on both sides of the conflict,
Chechnya has not been the aggressor and has not "invaded" any other territory.
It has, in contrast, allowed Ingushetia to secede peacefully. Finally, violence
35 HALPERIN, supra note 1, at 47.
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has already begun, but this fact should not be dispositive, lest a ruling
government can defeat any legal claim to secession through the threat of
violence.
International law scholars have struggled to define the right of self-
determination in the post-colonial era, and consequently have produced a
diffuse array of factors and requirements to define that right. Yet the
Chechens and the state of Chechnya have passed all these requirements and
the international community still refuses to recognize its independent status.
Why have the members of the United Nations acted so ambivalently towards
the former republics of Russia and the Soviet Union? One might speculate
that countries feared even further instability from further disintegration; but
looking at the situation as Chechnya merely being one of the states that formed
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, would its secession be that destabilizing
and unjustifiable? The United Nations should clearly define the criteria for
people to invoke the right to self-determination in the near future. If they do
not, the United Nations risks losing credibility as an organization that
unbiasedly admits members on the basis of legal merit rather than politics. If
the case of Chechnya is international law, is it international justice?. The
famous Russian icon, Count Leo Tolstoy, himself, realized after he had taken
part on a long ago Russian assault on Grozny in 1852, that the situation was
unjust.31 It is strange that one hundred and forty years later, the
international community has not.
36 Peter Crane, What Would Tolstoy Say?, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1995, at C7.
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